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AT THE INTERSECTION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: WHY AMERICAN INTERESTS 





Following the interwar period and disastrous results of an isolationist 
foreign policy, the United States changed course coming out of the 
Second World War.  Assuming the global leadership role, the U.S. led 
the international effort to design and build the international institutions 
and organizations that would ensure and manage the global recovery 
from the war that ravaged the world’s economy, deter future wars by 
providing checks on and a balance of power, and that would ensure, to 
some degree, international systems based on rule of law.  Pursuit of 
U.S. interests should, when possible, be carried out within that 
international legal framework.  The U.S. should conform its actions to 
international legal norms, so long as it does not create a substantial 
departure from pursuit of national interests.  In considering ratification 
of conventions and treaties in areas of security and human rights, the 
U.S. should consider whether ceding sovereignty to unelected 
committees charged with monitoring U.S. compliance with the terms of 
those agreements is in U.S. interests.  On the other hand, ceding 
sovereignty as a result of continued global leadership in the 
international economic institutions built by the U.S. and its allies may 
actually weigh in favor of U.S. interests.  Finally, diverging from 
traditional international rules when dealing with contemporary 
challenges may also be in U.S. interests, particularly when adhering to 
values concerning the rule of law that respects human rights.  To that 
end, the U.S. should consider, with partners when possible, the 
evolvement of new norms through action.  Justification based on 
legitimacy is a valid interest. The U.S. should also rely on national 
institutions in managing the conflict between national interests and 
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 “Do you never stop to reflect just what it is that America stands for?  If 
she stands for one thing more than another, it is for the sovereignty of 
self-governing peoples . . .” 




Chief among United States values are the principles of 
sovereignty and self-determination, both of which are sacred in the U.S. 
system of government and, accordingly, central to U.S. policy interests.  
As such, U.S. decisions to enter into international agreements, or 
otherwise adhere to international law, should not be made solely in 
accordance with commitments to international institutions or 
organizations, particularly at the expense of commitments to our own 
principles and interests.  As an example, certain treaties—such as the 
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) and the 
U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)—
favored by one or the other political branches might do little to promote 
broad U.S. interests and, instead, would risk subjecting the U.S. to 
sources of law inconsistent with our principles of government.2 
 
The Executive, when signing treaties knowing that Senate 
support is insufficient, commits the U.S. under international law “to 
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of those 
treaties.3  Despite such international legal commitment, however, those 
                                                     
1. Woodrow Wilson, Speech on Military Preparedness at Soldiers’ 
Memorial Hall, Pittsburgh, PA (Jan. 29, 1916), in Addresses of 
President Wilson, UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL SERIAL SET, 11 
(1916). 
2  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRPD]; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (treaties 
ratified by the U.S. become the “supreme Law of the Land,” on par 
with federal statutes, and the treaty’s terms, or the interpretation of 
those terms by a treaty committee, may not conform to either existing 
state and federal law or prevalent social, cultural, and economic norms 
observed in the U.S.). 
3  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (the U.S. has not ratified the treaty but many parts 
are considered customary international law); cf. Curtis A. Bradley, 
Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 
 Journal of International Law  
194 
treaties have no domestic legal effect.4  Further, the assertion that the 
U.S. should engage broadly in international commitments is 
inconsistent with public opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research 
Center in December 2013.5 
 
Since the Second World War, the U.S. has exercised global 
leadership in the creation and management of international institutions 
and organizations built to rehabilitate damaged economies, promote 
and sustain economic development and growth, deter war and preserve 
peace, and facilitate international cooperation in many other necessary 
areas.  The growth of those institutions and organizations has been 
accompanied by a growth in treaties, conventions, and international 
agreements, as well as evolving customary international law. 
 
Some agreements, such as the multilateral North Atlantic 
Treaty, have been and continue to be consistent with U.S. interests.6  
Others reach a point where they are simply incompatible with U.S. 
interests.7  Some conventions appear to the Executive to be in U.S. 
                                                                                                          
HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 308 (2007) (construing the obligation “as 
precluding only actions that would substantially undermine the ability 
of the parties to comply with, or benefit from, the treaty after 
ratification.”). 
4  See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-05 (2008) (holding that 
while a treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not 
binding domestic law without Congressional implementing legislation 
or the treaty itself conveys the intention that it be self-executing and 
ratified on that basis.); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 525-26 (stating that the 
President has an array of political and diplomatic means available to 
enforce international obligations, but unilaterally converting a non-self-
executing treaty into a self-executing one is not among them; 
responsibility for transforming international obligation arising from 
non-self-executing treaty into domestic law is Congress’s 
responsibility.). 
5  Pew Research Center, Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support 
for Global Engagement Slips (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.people-
press.org/files/legacy-pdf/12-3-13%20APW%20VI%20release.pdf. 
6  See generally Jane E. Stromseth, The North Atlantic Treaty and 
European Security After the Cold War, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 479 
(1991). 
7  Douglas J. Ende, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice: A Proposal for A New United States 
Declaration, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1145 (1986). 
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interests, but agreement cannot be found in the Senate.8  And, finally, 
some international conventions simply have no political support 
regarding U.S. interests.9 
 
This paper argues that international legal instruments and 
norms governing international cooperation are not always consistent 
with U.S. interests, and that pursuit of U.S. interests should prevail 
when inconsistent with those instruments and norms.  Following this 
introduction, part II of this paper will look at the historical transition in 
the first half of the twentieth century from a U.S. isolationist foreign 
policy to a fully engaged foreign policy of multilateralism beginning in 
the early 1940s.  Part II will also look at the role of the U.S. as it 
engaged in that policy, including the creation of the U.N. and 
associated institutions, and look at the rise of international law 
following the Second World War and why states adhered to 
international law.  While part III looks at some of the threats from the 
interpretation, and manipulation, of international law to U.S. interests, 
part IV looks at how U.S. political and legal frameworks might coexist 
with international law and transform international legal institutions to 
better align with U.S. interests. 
 
II. THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE RISE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AGREEMENTS AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
A. Pre-WWII – U.S. Isolationist Policy 
 
Multilateralism has been defined as “international governance 
of the ‘many,’” with its principal focus being the “opposition [of] 
bilateral and discriminatory arrangements . . . believed to enhance the 
leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international 
conflict.”10  Thus, cooperation among many states is likely to reduce 
conflict.  But in the early part of the last century starting around 1920-
                                                     
8  See generally Kevin Walker, Comparing American Disability Laws 
to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities with 
Respect to Postsecondary Education for Persons with Intellectual 
Disabilities, 12 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 115 (2014). 
9  See generally David J. Scheffer, The United States and the 
International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12 (1999). 
10  Miles Kahler, Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers, 46 
INT'L ORG. 681, 681 (1992). 
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30’s, U.S. foreign policy was much more akin to an isolationist 
policy.11 
 
The U.S. departed briefly from this policy when it declared 
war on Germany in 1917, following continued German submarine 
attacks on U.S. ships in the North Atlantic.12  Following the war, and 
despite the efforts of President Woodrow Wilson to assume a broader 
multilateral role for the U.S. in foreign relations, the U.S. resumed its 
isolationist policies when the Senate rejected both the Treaty of 
Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations.13  One of the 
principal obstacles to achieving the two-thirds consent required by the 
Senate was opposition to Article X of the treaty, which, according to 
opponents, ceded U.S. war powers, and, thus, elements of U.S. 
sovereignty, to the Council of the League of Nations.14  Thus, 
Congressional opponents, fearing consequences of wading into 
increasingly complex European affairs likely to result from the peace 
treaty, retreated to the habitual aversion to involvement beyond the 
confines of the Western Hemisphere. 
 
This aversion to a multilateral approach to foreign relations 
following the First World War has been cited as one of the reasons 
leading to the rise in German nationalism and, eventually, the Second 
World War.15  Prior to hostilities beginning in 1914 and dating back to 
the end of the nineteenth century, Britain had been ceding ground to 
                                                     
11  Milestones: 1899–1913, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF 
PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST., 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913 (last visited Mar. 1, 
2014). 
12  Milestones: 1914–1920, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF 
PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST., 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/wwi (last visited Mar. 1, 
2014). 
13  See Max Boot, When War Weariness Wears Off, THE WEEKLY 
STANDARD (Jan. 20, 2014), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/when-war-weariness-
wears_774085.html. 
14  The League of Nations, 1920, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU 
OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST., 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/league (last visited Mar. 
1, 2014); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
15  See THOMAS OATLEY, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 17-19 
(5th ed. 2011). 
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Germany, and the U.S., as the main infrastructure of the developing 
global economy.16  After the Treaty of Versailles was concluded, and 
throughout the decade following the war, Britain and France were 
compelled to enforce the debilitating reparations imposed on 
Germany.17  This imposition on post-war Germany, without any relief, 
can be sourced to U.S. decisions refusing any debt relief for Britain and 
France.18  The allies had borrowed heavily from the U.S. to finance 
their war efforts and, following the conclusion of hostilities, the U.S. 
refused any debt concessions.19  The U.S. further shunned Europe by 
restricting the number of immigrants permitted entry into the U.S.  
Quotas were introduced in 1921, and by 1929 only 150,000 immigrants 
per year were permitted entry into the U.S.20 
 
One result of the lack of cooperation was that Germany’s pre-
war growing economy was unable to recover and this impacted all of 
Europe, if not the U.S. as well.21  Economies of Europe, as well as the 
U.S. economy, contracted and instead of cooperative solutions, states 
began retreating further into economic isolation via trade barriers 
discriminating against foreign markets and favoring, instead, domestic 
manufacturers and producers.22  The resulting stock market crash of 
1929 and global economic decline fueled German nationalism, paving 
the way for the Nazi party’s rise and the century’s second Great War on 
the European continent barely twenty years after the end of the first.23 
 
Around 1940, the momentum for a shift from an isolationist to 
a multilateral approach in U.S. foreign relations gathered steam with 
recent German military success in Europe being the impetus behind the 
                                                     
16  Id. at 17.  
17  Id. 
18  Id. 
19  Id. 
20  The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act), OFFICE OF 
THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST., 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
21  See OATLEY, supra note 15. 
22  Id. 
23  Milestones: 1937–1945, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF 
PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST., 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945 (last visited Mar. 1, 
2014). 
 Journal of International Law  
198 
shift.24  The U.S. feared not only German military success in Europe, 
but also Japanese military success in East Asia, and worried that the 
Western Hemisphere could be a subsequent target.25  By July 1941, the 
U.S. froze Japanese assets and ceased supporting Japan with oil and 
other commodities, and Japan had become heavily dependent upon 
those U.S. exports to sustain its imperial ambitions in East Asia.26  
Japan viewed U.S. hegemony in the West, and U.S. assertion of the 
Monroe Doctrine, as justification for its own imperial ambitions.  
Seeing the U.S. as threatening both Japan’s reputation and economy, 
Japan saw itself in a position in which the only choices were war, or 
subservience, to the U.S.27  It was not until the attack at Pearl Harbor, 
however, that the U.S. finally galvanized for total war, and a permanent 
repeal of a primarily isolationist policy. 
 
B. Post-WWII – Transition to a Policy of 
Multilateralism 
 
Even before the end of the Second World War, Western 
countries agreed on the need to engage in multilateral negotiations. 
These negotiations intended to create international agreements and 
institutions designed to facilitate the management of historical conflicts 
and the rebuilding of war-ravaged countries.28  Many of these new 
institutions were economic in nature designed along the premise that 
                                                     
24  Milestones: Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early 
Years of World War II, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUB. 
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST., http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-
1945/lend-lease (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
25  Milestones: Japan, China, the United States and the Road to Pearl 
Harbor, 1937–41, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUB. 
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST., http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-
1945/pearl-harbor (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
26  See Dr. Jeffrey Record, Japan's Decision for War in 1941: Some 
Enduring Lessons, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE (SSI) (Feb. 9, 2009), 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=905. 
27  Id. 
28  Milestones: Wartime Conferences, 1941–1945, OFFICE OF THE 
HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST., 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/war-time-conferences 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
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mutual economic interdependence would be a strong deterrence to 
war.29 
 
The architecture of this post-war global economic 
interdependent system was created at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 
and became known as the Bretton Woods Conference.30  The primary 
outcomes of Bretton Woods were the establishment of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (World Bank).31 
 
The IMF was designed to monitor balance of payments and 
assist in the reconstruction of the global international payment system.32  
Member states contribute to a pool through a quota system from which 
states with payment imbalances may temporarily borrow funds.33  
Through this and other activities such as monitoring other member 
states’ economies and the demand for self-correcting policies, the IMF 
improves member states’ economies.34 
 
The World Bank was responsible for financing and 
supervising international reconstruction and development of European 
nations devastated by the Second World War.35  After the 
reconstruction of Europe, the World Bank advanced global economic 
development and poverty eradication efforts.36 
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
signed later in 1947.  The purpose of the GATT, which became the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, was the regulation of 
international trade, to include the substantial reduction of barriers to 
                                                     
29  MARGOT HORSPOOL & MATTHEW HUMPHREYS, EUROPEAN UNION 
LAW 14 (6th ed. 2012). 
30  Milestones: Bretton Woods-GATT, 1941–1947, OFFICE OF THE 
HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST., 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/bretton-woods (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
31  Id. 
32  See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 214-15; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do 
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2614 (1997). 
33  See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 214. 
34  Id.; Koh, supra note 32. 
35  See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 300; Koh, supra note 32. 
36  See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 300; Koh, supra note 32. 
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free trade.37  Regional economic communities reinforced these 
multilateral economic organizations, and are governed by their own 
international agreement.38 
 
C.  The United Nations 
 
The most significant multilateral institution to be created out 
of the Second World War was when the U.N.  Representatives from the 
U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union, and China met in August and 
September of 1944 in Washington to create a post-war organization 
based on collective security principles.39  Major components of this 
new, multilateral, collective security organization included the General 
Assembly, represented by all member states, and the Security Council, 
represented by only the few remaining major powers following the 
Second World War.40 
 
The U.N., a multilateral, international organization, was 
officially established on October 24, 1945, to promote international 
peace and cooperation.41  The U.N. also created a substantial body of 
international law through numerous treaties and conventions.42  States 
bind themselves legally under international law when they become 
signatories to the U.N. Charter, as well as various associated treaties 
and conventions.43  Now bound under international law, these same 
states essentially cede, voluntarily, a portion of their sovereignty by 
permitting, in advance, the U.N. to take enforcement action against 
them should they violate certain articles of the Charter.44 
                                                     
37  See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 4. 
38  See Koh, supra note 32. 
39  Milestones: The Formation of the United Nations, 1945, OFFICE OF 
THE HISTORIAN, BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF ST., 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/un (last visited Mar. 29, 
2014). 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  See Role of the United Nations in International Law, 2011 TREATY 
EVENT: TOWARDS UNIVERSAL  
PARTICIPATION AND IMPLEMENTATION, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2011/Press_kit/fact_sheet_5_e
nglish.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2014). 
43  See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
44  See, e.g., U.N. Charter ch. VII. 
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The U.S. thought the U.N. was capable of success where the 
League of Nations was not.45  President Franklin Roosevelt, with the 
benefit of hindsight, took a different approach than that of President 
Wilson to ensure U.S. Senate support for membership in this global 
governing institution.46  President Roosevelt worked for bipartisan 
support, in addition to public support, for U.S. membership in a global 
organization designed to prevent future wars like those fought in 
Europe twice in the past thirty years, as well as in the Pacific.47  
President Roosevelt’s approach garnered overwhelming Senate 
approval.48 
 
The lessons learned from the U.S. refusal to accept its global 
leadership role following the First World War, corresponding with its 
return to an isolationist policy, were key in spurring U.S. policymakers 
to action in planning for a new, post-war world order even before the 
Second World War was concluded.49  It was clear that the Second 
World War was caused, at least in part, by the U.S. refusal to lead a 
rebuilding effort for the global economy in the 1920s.50  But the U.S. 
emerged from the Second World War powerful, capable, and willing to 
assume a global leadership role.  Leading a multilateral effort in 
creating the international institutions that would deter future wars, spur 
global economic recovery, growth, stability, and promote human 
rights.51 
 
D. Why Do Nations Comply with International 
Law? 
 
The success of the U.S.-led post-war efforts depended upon 
the member states’ commitment, including that of the U.S., to adhering 
to the binding legal agreements into which they had entered.  Violation 
of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, for example, might trigger an 
enforcement action designed to compel a member state into 
                                                     
45  See Milestones: The Formation of the United Nations, supra note 
39. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 17-18. 
50  Id. at 18. 
51  Id. at 19. 
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compliance.52  But not all violations of the agreements entered into by 
states trigger enforcement actions, and so motivation by member states 
to comply must lie, at least in part, elsewhere. 
Generally, international rules often go unenforced; however, 
states still obey those rules nonetheless.53  This is demonstrated by the 
belief on the part of the state that it has a legal obligation to adhere to 
the rules (known as opinio juris sive necessitatis).54  Adherence to those 
rules has also been attributed to several factors including: the declining 
notion of sovereignty; an increase in the number of international 
organizations and non-state actors; an increased blurring of the lines 
between public and private; the proliferation of treaty-based and 
customary rules; and the homogenization of domestic and international 
systems.55 
 
During the Cold War, the superpowers’ adherence to 
international law, which derived from international organizations, 
institutions, and agreements, fell in importance and gave way to 
political, as opposed to legal, concepts such as realism.56  According to 
realism, world politics is driven by competitive self-interest and not 
constrained by international legal obligations.57  Interstate cooperation 
took a back seat to competitive self-interest during this period, until 
new entities began crowding the field of international law.58 
 
The latter part of the twentieth century saw the growth of non-
state actors, such as multinational corporations and international non-
governmental organizations, intersecting legally with states and 
compelling greater legal cooperation among states and non-state 
actors.59  The collapse of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the 
Cold War seemed to create a further resurgence in international 
                                                     
52  See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
53 Koh, supra note 32, at 2603 (citing HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS 
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 249-52 (2nd 
ed. 1954)). 
54  See Alan Watson, An Approach to Customary Law, 1984 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 561, 562-63 (1984). 
55  See Koh, supra note 32, at 2604. 
56  Id. at 2615. 
57  See generally JOHN ROURKE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON THE 
WORLD STAGE (2007). 
58  See Koh, supra note 32, at 2624. 
59  Id. at 2625. 
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cooperation.60  In 1991, the U.N. authorized the forcible removal of Iraq 
from Kuwaiti territory, and a large multi-national force was cobbled 
together for just that task.61  In 1992, members of the European 
Community signed the Treaty of Maastricht.62  Thereafter, in 1994, the 
U.S., along with its North American partners, concluded the North 
American Free Trade Agreement.63  New international law was being 
created through multilateral engagement, but challenges to international 
cooperation would highlight the difficulties of global legal 
governance.64 
 
III. THE RISING THREAT TO AMERICAN INTERESTS FROM 
THE RISING INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
A. Globalization and the Effects on U.S. Interests 
 
Globalization is a fiercely disputed topic.65 What is not 
disputed, however, is that it creates an ever-increasing body of 
regulation and corresponding obligations to manage the state-to-state 
and state-to-non-state interactions of those seeking to benefit from 
globalization.66  For example, conventions such as the UNCLOS and 
CRPD are perceived as necessary because of globalization.  However, 
globalization is not ordered only according to the principles of 
international legal agreements.67  Thus, not every international 
agreement on a topic pertaining to U.S. interests, whether 
globalization-related or not, is seen by the U.S. to be in its interests.68 
                                                     
60  Id. at 2630. 
61  S.C. Res. 678, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
62  Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992 
O.J. C 191/1. 
63  North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289. 
64  See Koh, supra note 32, at 2616. 
65  See OATLEY, supra note 15, at 346-68. 
66  Id. at 358-67. 
67  Rafael Domingo, The Crisis of International Law, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 1543, 1546 (2009); see generally Ryan Morrow, 
Treaties and the Federal Balance in an Era of Globalization, E-
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.e-
ir.info/2011/01/18/treaties-and-the-federal-balance-in-an-era-of-
globalization/. 
68  See generally Peter Roff, Kill the Law of the Sea Treaty, U.S. NEWS 
(May 10, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-
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Treaties like the UNCLOS and CRPD risk permitting 
international officials to set policy in areas intended to be regulated by 
the U.S. government, and such treaties risk infringing state 
sovereignty.69  For example, UNCLOS empowers a U.N. agency, the 
International Seabed Authority, to transfer technology and wealth from 
developed to undeveloped nations.70  Thus, on some issues of global 
importance, the U.S. elects not to become a signatory by either not 
concluding the agreement at all or by the Senate choosing not to grant 
consent to the treaty.71  This is not the same as the U.S. neither 
observing nor adhering to certain agreements to which the U.S. has 
decided not to become a signatory, but instead that the U.S., in 
foregoing ratification of the treaty, chooses not to be legally bound 
under international law by the specific international agreement.72 
 
B. Lawfare – An Example of the Effects of 
International Law on U.S. Interests 
 
An area in which the ability to address security interests is 
being hampered is lawfare.73  The term, “lawfare,” was first used 
extensively by Major General Charles Dunlap, the former Deputy 
                                                                                                          
roff/2012/05/10/kill-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty; Stian Reklev, Australia's 
opposition backs Kyoto 2, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/16/us-australia-kyoto-
idUSBRE87F0A520120816. 
69  U.S. Senator Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 93, 94 (2014). 
70  Melody Finnemore, Fluid Body of Law from Maritime Statutes of 
Old to New Developments in Wave and Tidal Energy, Ocean Law 
Continues to Evolve, OR. ST. B. BULL., May 2010, at 19, 23; see also 
George F. Will, The LOST sinkhole, WASH. POST (June 22, 2012), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-
22/opinions/35461763_1_royalty-payments-reagan-adviser-sea-treaty. 
71  See Roff, supra note 68; see generally Reklev, supra note 68. 
72  See e.g., CRPD, supra note 2. 
73  See Sebastian Gorka, Briefing: White House Review Threatens 
Counter-Terrorism Operations, THE LAWFARE PROJECT (Dec. 5, 2011), 
available at http://www.thelawfareproject.org/summary-of-white-
house-review-briefing.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (summarizing 
that this action is “directly impacting the capacity of federal agencies . . 
. to protect the United States from . . . threats to our security.”). 
 Journal of International Law  
205 
Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Air Force.74  Dunlap defines 
lawfare “as the strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for 
traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.”75  As 
such, the term can be used for positive and negative purposes.76  More 
often, and more recently, the term is used as a label to criticize those 
who manipulate international law, legal proceedings, and judicial 
systems to make claims against the state, especially in areas related to 
strategic military and political goals.77 
 
While the term is controversial, the increased use of the 
concept is undeniable.78  Lawfare is often used as a weapon in 
asymmetrical warfare by guerrillas or terrorists against larger nations 
where the rule of law is developed.79  As an example, lawfare can be the 
exploitation of actual or orchestrated violations of the Law of Armed 
Conflict by non-state enemy combatants as a strategy to counter the 
effectiveness of a superior armed force.80  Israel is a frequent target of 
lawfare, as noted by legal scholar Anne Herzberg.  She writes that the 
 
detractors of the Jewish state are increasingly using 
civil lawsuits and criminal investigations around the 
world to tie Israel's hands against Palestinian terror 
by accusing Jerusalem of “war crimes” and “crimes 
against humanity.”  In the process, the NGOs also 
subvert and interfere with the diplomatic relations of 
                                                     
74  Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. 
INT'L AFF. 146, 146 (2008). 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at 147. 
77  Brooke Goldstein & Benjamin Ryberg, The Emerging Face of 
Lawfare: Legal Maneuvering Designed to Hinder the Exposure of 
Terrorism and Terror Financing, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 634, 637 
(2013). 
78  See generally David Scheffer, Whose Lawfare Is It, Anyway?, 43 
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 215 (2010). 
79  See Nathaniel Burney, International Law: a Brief Primer, THE 
BURNEY LAW FIRM, LLC, 
http://www.burneylawfirm.com/international_law_primer (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2014). 
80  See Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Lawfare amid warfare, WASH. 
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2007), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/aug/03/lawfare-amid-
warfare/. 
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Western countries with Israel.  These lawsuits 
typically ignore the difficulty Israel faces in fighting 
terrorists who target Israeli civilians while hiding 
among their own civilian populations.  The 
accusations also ignore the measures Israel takes to 
avoid civilian casualties, including the strictest rules 
of engagement for any Western army.  While Israel is 
not the only country that has been subject to this sort 
of lawfare – several prominent NGOs have filed 
similar suits against U.S. officials in France and 
Germany – it is a primary target.81 
 
Lawfare can also include frivolous lawsuits against journalists 
and politicians who speak publicly about issues of national security.82  
In 2005, for example, the Islamic Society of Boston filed a defamation 
lawsuit against seventeen media defendants for speaking publicly about 
the Society's alleged connections to radical Islam and for commenting 
critically on the construction of the Society's Saudi-funded Boston 
mosque.83  Eventually, the suit was dismissed.84 
 
Misuse of legal terminology to influence public opinion is also 
considered lawfare.85  As an example, the U.N. has passed a Resolution 
on Combating Defamation of Religions nearly every year since 1999.86  
There are claims that the Resolution is a political attempt to stifle any 
criticism of Islam and, in turn, free speech.87  But international law 
                                                     
81  See Anne Herzberg, Lawfare Against Israel, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 
2008), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122583394143998285.html. 
82  Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Semiotic Definition of “Lawfare”, 43 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 29, 53 (2010). 
 
83  See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. New York Times Co., 2003 WL 
403135 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2003). 
84  Global Relief Found., Inc. v. New York Times Co., 390 F.3d 973, 
990 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court decision “to enter summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants because their reports about GRF 
were substantially true.”). 
85  See Tiefenbrun, supra note 82, at 56. 
86  See Robert Evans, Islamic bloc drops U.N. drive on defaming 
religion, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2011), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/03/24/idINIndia-55861720110324. 
87  See Tiefenbrun, supra note 82, at 56. 
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attorney Elisabeth Samson argues that defamation of a religion is a 
legal impossibility, and thus a form of lawfare.88  A religion is not a 
““person, business, group or government,” all of which are tangible 
entities required by the legal definition of defamation.”89  Instead, 
religion is a set of beliefs.90  U.S. recognition of such a resolution would 
not be compatible with the First Amendment, which provides that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”91  
Further, “the hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free 
trade in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people 
might find distasteful or discomforting.”92 
 
Exploitation of universal jurisdiction laws has been labeled 
lawfare as well.93  Cited examples include: Jordan's extradition demand 
for a Dutch politician to stand trial for blasphemy of Islam, Belgium's 
attempted prosecution of former U.S. President George Bush and 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair for war crimes, and a South African 
legal organization’s call for U.S. President Barack Obama’s indictment 
for crimes against humanity and genocide.94  Of course, not all lawsuits 
similar to the types discussed are acts of lawfare.  But manipulation of 
Western court systems, use of Western “hate speech laws,” and other 
products of political correctness employed to harm democratic 






                                                     
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
92  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). 
93  See Tiefenbrun, supra note 82, at 58. 
94  Brooke Goldstein, Opening Remarks at the Lawfare Conference 
(March 11, 2010), http://www.thelawfareproject.org/141/opening-
remarks; Press Release – Obama Docket, THE MUSLIM LAWYERS 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.mlajhb.com/press-release-obama-docket 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
95  See Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eitan Meyer, “Legal Jihad”: How 
Islamist Lawfare Tactics Are Targeting Free Speech, 15 ILSA J. INT'L 
& COMP. L. 395, 409 (2009). 
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E. Ceding American Sovereignty 
 
 The Threat to U.S. Democracy from 6.
Global Governance 
 
Sovereignty is a concept viewed quite differently among 
different states.96  For example, the U.S. is quite principled with regards 
to sovereignty while European states are willing to cede sovereignty in 
many areas.97  The European Union (EU) has developed a new body of 
international economic law and permitted individual European states, 
by ceding parts of their national sovereignty, to achieve economies of 
scale in negotiations with non-EU states.98  This, in turn, has improved 
their negotiation positions with other states.99  Whatever the criticism of 
the individual European states’ ceding of national sovereignty through 
the EU, it has demonstrated some success for many EU states in areas 
of economic growth despite the turmoil from the global economic 
downturn beginning in 2008.100 
 
But where the EU may benefit from the imposition on their 
individual states’ democratic processes of supranational or international 
law, the U.S. would not.  Whether international law derives from 
decisions of courts addressing international issues or from rules and 
regulations of international organizations like those created in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, both have implications for a 
democratic state in that both may impose legal outcomes without the 
direct involvement of the democratic state’s lawmaking functionaries.101 
 
In the case of law deriving from court decisions, there is no 
involvement of a state’s popular decision-making process.102  On the 
                                                     
96  See Robert O. Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European 
Union and the United States, 40 JCMS: J. OF COMMON MARKET STUD., 
743, 744-46 (2002). 
97  Id.; see also Alex Newman, The EU: Regionalization Trumps 
Sovereignty, THE NEW AMERICAN (Aug. 20, 2013), 
http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/item/16343-the-eu-
regionalization-trumps-sovereignty. 
98  Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American 
Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 237, 243 (2000). 
99  Id. 
100  Id. at 244. 
101  Id. at 245. 
102  Id. 
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other hand, law created by the establishment of international 
organizations permits some limited role for the U.S. executive and 
legislative branches in drafting the details of the agreement to which 
the U.S. will accede.103  In turn, each branch has a say in crafting the 
impending legislation, assuming necessity, to determine how 
international law will become domestic law.104  Further, both branches 
may agree to withdraw the U.S. from its commitment should that 
commitment be considered no longer consistent with U.S. interests.105  
While checks on the latter may afford the U.S. greater flexibility than 
on the former, checks on international law created by international 
organizations are not necessarily sufficient.106 
 
 Use of Force 7.
 
Decisions concerning whether to threaten or actually use 
military force are among the most, if not the most, important decisions 
a state considers.  Limiting a state’s authority for those decisions by 
subjecting them to a supranational authoritative source diminishes a 
state’s sovereignty.107  Of course an entirely unilateral, non-coalition 
use of force extraterritorially by a state for reasons based solely on 
national self-interest should never be justified or permitted by the 
international community.  But just because international officials and 
legal scholars invoke the U.N. Charter as rationale for the illegality of 
the use of force does not make the action illegitimate or even 
impermissible.108 
 
In March 1999, air forces from member states of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began bombing targets in the 
former Yugoslavia in order to end widespread violations of 
international law perpetrated by Serbian military and police forces 
against Kosovar Albanians.109  Because the U.N. Security Council 
action did not sanction the NATO action, many legal observers 
                                                     
103  Id. 
104  Id. at 244. 
105  Id. at 245. 
106  See generally id. at 252-53. 
107  John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 
CHI. J. INT'L L. 205, 208 (2000). 
108  See generally INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT * INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSE * LESSONS LEARNED 163-201 (2001). 
109 Id. at 33-98; see Bolton, supra note 107, at 208. 
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considered the action a violation of the U.N. Charter.110  But attempt by 
the U.N. Security Council to instead condemn the action was actually 
defeated by a wide margin.111  NATO member states found justification 
in the action.  The U.S. concluded the action was justified based on 
excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian forces, pending 
actions by Serbian forces targeting Kosovar Albanians, and the threat to 
the wider region including Albania, Macedonia, and NATO allies 
Greece and Turkey.112  Britain also found legal justification in that force 
is permissible in extreme circumstances in order to prevent a pending 
humanitarian atrocity.113 
 
 International Criminal Court 8.
 
Another international legal instrument that risked ceding U.S. 
sovereignty was the International Criminal Court (ICC).114  Initially 
supportive of the ICC, the U.S. ultimately renounced its signature of 
the treaty.115  U.S. personnel would have come under the jurisdiction of 
the ICC if either the U.S. ratified the treaty or if U.S. personnel 
engaged in conduct determined by the ICC to be under their criminal 
jurisdiction and occurring within the territory of a state party to the 
                                                     
110  See generally Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of 
“Humanitarian Intervention”, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824 (1999); cf. 
generally Robert J. Delahunty & Antonio F. Perez, The Kosovo Crisis: 
A Dostoievskian Dialogue on International Law, Statecraft, and 
Soulcraft, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 15 (2009). 
111  Ian Williams, The UN's Surprising Support, INSTITUTE FOR WAR & 
PEACE REPORTING (Apr. 19, 1999), http://iwpr.net/report-news/uns-
surprising-support. 
112  Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States 
Relating to International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 631 (1999). 
113  See KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND 
INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 137 (Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh 
Thakur eds., 2000). 
114  See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
115  See Scheffer, supra note 9; Richard J. Goldstone, U.S. Withdrawal 
from ICC Undermines Decades of American Leadership in 
International Justice, THIRD WORLD TRAVELER, 
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/International_War_Crimes/USWith
drawal_ICC_Goldstone.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
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treaty.116  The risk to U.S. sovereignty is the transfer of authority to 
make law to an international institution.117  The ICC can expand the 
definition of offenses covered under the statute by gaining the approval 
of only two-thirds of the states party to the treaty.118  Additionally, some 
descriptions of crimes covered under the statute may not be interpreted 
uniformly and, therefore, permit the ICC to conclude its own 
jurisdiction through such non-uniform interpretation.119 
 
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with 9.
Disabilities (CRPD) 
 
The CRPD, signed by the Executive and awaiting the advice 
and consent of the Senate, is intended to protect the rights and dignity 
of persons with disabilities.120  From a public diplomacy perspective, it 
is presumed that the U.S. would boost its global reputation by holding 
itself to high human rights standard.  However, acceding to the treaty, 
without reservations, would risk ceding authority to an international 
committee of appointed experts from, potentially, countries with 
questionable human rights records.121  Similar human rights treaties 
often establish such a committee of experts to periodically review 
implementation of the treaty by the parties.  These committees, 
however, are not democratically elected, but instead appointed by state 
parties to the treaty, regardless of their human rights record. 
 
With regards to the CRPD, the committee “shall make such 
suggestions and general recommendations on the report as it may 
consider appropriate . . . and may request further information from 
States Parties relevant to the implementation of the present 
Convention.”122  Such recommendations may not be consistent with 
U.S. cultural, social, economic, and legal traditions and norms.  More 
important, with regards to U.S. interests and persons, the U.S. already 
                                                     
116  See Stephan, supra note 98, at 254. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. at 253-55. 
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121  U.N. Watch, What if dictatorships judged the world on human 
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has ample domestic laws protecting the rights of disabled individuals.123  
Additionally, numerous federal agencies are also charged with 
protecting those rights.124  Thus, affected U.S. persons would 
experience no discernible benefit from U.S. accession to this treaty. 
 
IV. HOW PRIORITIZING AMERICAN INTERESTS MIGHT 
COEXIST WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
That international law, including customary international law, 
treaties, conventions, and other international agreements, cannot 
coexist with U.S. interests is inaccurate.  The U.S. has provided global 
leadership since the Second World War and it would run counter to 
U.S. interests to disengage from existing and beneficial international 
legal institutions and obligations and risk losing that global leadership 
role.  There are several areas in which U.S. interests can facilitate the 
transformation of international law. 
 
A. Intervention Based on Legitimacy, Not Just 
Legality 
 
The 1999 NATO Kosovo action was condemned by several 
states, including two of the five permanent Security Council members, 
as being illegal.125  However, the U.S. and its NATO allies, in using 
military force to halt the indiscriminate and excessive use of force by 
the Serbian military and paramilitary forces, acted on legitimate 
grounds.126  Following the Kosovo intervention, international legal 
scholar Antonio Cassese suggested that “under certain strict conditions 
resort to armed force may gradually become justified, even absent any 
                                                     
123 See e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); 42 U.S.C. ch. 126 (2011); 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 
(2012); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2011); 42 U.S.C. 
ch. 20, subchapter I-F (2011). 
124  Some of the federal agencies charged with protecting those rights 
include the U.S. Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Div.; U.S. Dep't of 
Transp. Fed. Transit Admin.; U.S. Dep't of Educ. Office for Civil 
Rights; U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. Office for Civil Rights; 
U.S. Dep't of Labor Civil Rights Center; U.S. Dep't of House. and 
Urban Dev.; U.S. Dep't of Interior Office of Civil Rights; and the U.S. 
Dep't of Agric. Office of the Assistance Sec'y for Civil Rights. 
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authorization by the Security Council.”127  Indeed, international 
lawyer Celeste Poltak notes that: 
 
while the terms of the Charter seem clear, in that 
Article 2(4) contains an absolute prohibition on the 
use of force, Article 2(4) may nevertheless lend itself 
to a narrow exception.  The idea that the well-
founded prohibition on the use of force is capable of 
exception in cases of extreme humanitarian need is 
consistent with: the principles of interpretation 
applicable to constituent documents; the evolution of 
the human rights paradigm at international law; and 
the evolving notion of a “threat to the peace.”  While 
the core prohibition on the use of force remains as 
relevant in the twenty-first century as it did in 1945 
when the Charter first came into force in order to 
preserve a stable global order, the international 
context in which the prohibition was first articulated 
has changed.128 
 
Poltak further indicates that the long-term flexibility of a:  
 
treaty rests largely on its ability to adapt to the 
changing needs of the context in which it functions” 
and that excising “a restrictive exception to the 
prohibition on the use of force in cases of 
humanitarian catastrophes involving the large scale 
loss of life is consistent with the overarching goals 
and purposes of the Charter and contemporary 
international law.129 
 
In 2001, the Canadian government presented to the U.N. 
General Assembly findings from research regarding ways to protect 
vulnerable populations in a manner that could be considered legitimate, 
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Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World 
Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23, 27 (1999). 
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and thus legal.130  The doctrine is referred to as the Responsibility to 
Protect, or R2P, and emphasizes prevention of manmade humanitarian 
catastrophes, reaction to those catastrophes when they do arise, and 
rebuilding following any necessary intervention.131  The R2P report lists 
six criteria legitimizing intervention, despite claims of illegality, in 
such circumstances: appropriate authority, just cause, appropriate 
intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects for 
success.132 
 
Despite this framework proposing the legitimization of 
intervention into the territory of another state for purposes of abating a 
state-made humanitarian crisis, the international community failed to 
intervene into the Darfur region of Sudan after 2003 when Arab militias 
began an ethnic cleansing campaign against non-Arab Sudanese in the 
region.  Unfortunately, continued arguments to the contrary emphasize 
that any intervention, including on humanitarian grounds, is 
permissible “only in self defense or in actions authorized by the 
Security Council.”133 
 
Darfur was an example where R2P provided both justification 
and authority for intervention on humanitarian grounds.  Additionally, 
the U.N. Charter could have been cited as facilitating intervention 
under R2P by permitting U.N. Members to take action to achieve 
universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without 
distinction to race or religion.134  Further, a combined intervention in 
Darfur would have served not only humanitarian interests, but regional 
security interests as well.135 
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Syria is another example of where a sovereign state leader 
harmed his own people.  President Barack Obama laid out the 
justification, under both domestic and international law, for 
intervention in Syria in September 2013, but ultimately elected not to 
do so.136  Some legal experts agreed that President Obama would have 
violated both domestic and international law had he intervened.137  But 
the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel has argued on prior 
occasions that the credibility of the U.N. Security Council is in U.S. 
interests and, therefore, can justify the President’s authority to use 
military force absent prior authorization from Congress.138  Under 
international law, the U.S. and coalition partners could have cited the 
doctrine of R2P, building upon the purposes of the Kosovo intervention 
and pushing the boundaries for a new, and necessary, international 
norm. 
 
B. Working within National Institutions and 
Transforming International Institutions 
 
U.S. interests can also better coexist within the international 
legal structure if the U.S. better utilizes existing national institutions 
and works to transform international institutions. 
 
 Sovereignty and International Cooperation 10.
 
By cooperating internationally, in international trade and 
capital markets for example, the U.S. does necessarily—and 
appropriately—cede some control of its domestic economy to 
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international organizations.139  The “international law” created by these 
international organizations does restrict the U.S. in its ability to carry 
out preferred domestic policy choices.140  But effecting transformation 
of those international institutions needs to take place within the context 
of the U.S. Constitution, ensuring no risk to sovereignty is ceded 
unnecessarily. 
 
The Supremacy Clause provides that the “Constitution . . . 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” followed by “the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States.”141  Therefore, participation in the international economic legal 
order, for example, necessarily takes place within the U.S. 
Constitution’s system of politics and laws.142  The “sovereignty of self-
governing peoples” is flexible.143  According to legal scholars Julian Ku 
and John Yoo, sovereignty of self-governing peoples: 
 
does not undermine the Constitution's allocation of 
powers or its guarantees of individual rights.  Indeed, 
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popular sovereignty already assumes that the U.S. 
government operates under substantial and 
fundamental constraints within its territory.  The U.S. 
cannot fully control external constraints on its 
sovereignty ... but it can restrict legal limits on its 
sovereignty by international organizations and 
multilateral treaties by withholding its consent to 
international regimes.144 
 
International trade and collective action necessitate 
international cooperation.  Resolving conflict that arises from 
international cooperative efforts by looking first to international law 
that trumps national sovereignty is not consistent with U.S. interests or 
the Constitution.145  However, the structural provisions of the 
Constitution do permit the coexistence of international legal institutions 
and U.S. political and legal institutions so that the U.S. may realize the 
benefits of international cooperation.146 
 
 Transforming the U.N. to Align with U.S. 11.
Interests 
 
It remains in U.S. interests to assist with the transformation of 
international institutions, most importantly the U.N.  The U.S. must 
engage its allies to shape the institutions to conform to U.S. interests 
when mutual, just as it did following the Second World War.147  The 
U.N. itself has advocated for transformational reform.148 Some of the 
more important proposals, cited by legal scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
in the 2004 U.N. report included: adding human security to state 
security in the context of international peace and security; adopting the 
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R2P doctrine; and reforming the Security Council.149  Each brings its 
own challenges, and unsurprisingly, none have been officially adopted 
by the U.N. 
 
The addition of human security, which refers to security of the 
individual from such dangers as disease, violence, or violation of 
individual rights, to state security shifts the emphasis of traditional 
security policy.  Human security emphasizes a non-coercive approach 
to security that is incompatible with traditional security policies of 
deterring and addressing foreign aggression.150  But human security, 
like the doctrine of R2P, is viewed differently between developed and 
developing countries.  Similar to R2P, effective reform efforts would 
create a framework to permit intervention to promote human security 
when the subject country lacks the capacity, or will, to secure their own 
population.151  Reform of the Security Council is equally challenging.  
And although some experts believe the Security Council is destined for 
irrelevance without reform, what such reform might bring remains 
unforeseeable.152  On the subject of reform through enlargement, the 
U.S. is seen by some as “ambivalent” due, in part, to concern over 
whether new members would accept policies consistent with U.S. 
interests.153  However, in 2004, the U.S. Congress also established a 
task force for the purpose of recommending measures designed to make 
the U.N. more effective in realizing the goals of the Charter.154  The 
U.S. report identified several areas consistent with both U.S. and U.N. 
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interests: (1) legitimacy, as the one place where countries can debate as 
equals; (2) diplomatic offices, for mediation and similar third-party 
assistance in brokering disputes; (3) special expertise, in areas such as 
election preparations and assistance with displaced persons; and (4) 
leverage, in areas such as preventing national rivalries from impairing 
humanitarian efforts.155 
 
Additionally, the U.S. agenda for proposed U.N. reform 
included: (1) institutional reforms; (2) specific steps to improve U.N. 
effectiveness in counter-terrorism and trafficking of weapons of mass 
destruction; (3) specific steps to prevent genocide and other human 
rights violations; (4) poverty eradication and political, legal, and 
economic infrastructure development; and (5) increased capacity in 
peacekeeping operations.156  The task force recommended neither 
reforms requiring revisions to the Charter nor expansion of the Security 
Council.157  What these reports do highlight, however, are areas where 
the U.S. can remain committed internationally while leading the 
transformation effort of an international institution and ensuring the end 




It is certainly not in the U.S. interest to disengage from 
existing international commitments.  However, it is equally unadvisable 
to submit further to international agreements that advance no 
substantive U.S. interests beyond, for example, promoting public 
diplomacy. 
 
Where the U.S. remains a party to multilateral international 
agreements that have become wholly incompatible with U.S. interests, 
the U.S. should take action to withdraw from such agreements.158  And 
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where the U.S. remains a party to those agreements that appear, 
perhaps, less consistent with U.S. interests, the U.S. should mobilize 
efforts to transform such institutions.159 
 
To that end, the U.S. should look, with partners whenever 
possible, to create new norms.  Justification based on legitimacy, when 
legality is questionable under traditional criteria, should not be avoided.  
The U.S. should also use national institutions to manage the conflicts 
between national interests and international cooperation, but always in 
a manner consistent with the U.S. Constitution and always with a 




                                                                                                          
international policy). 
159  See Report of the Task Force on the United Nations, supra note 
154, at 5. 
